How to Make the Perfect Citizen? by Reijers, Wessel
How to Make the Perfect Citizen?
Wessel Reijers 2019-06-17T10:00:59
‘How to make the perfect citizen?’ This question might have crossed the minds
of the Chinese government officials who in 2014 formulated the idea of a Social
Credit System. China is a vast country, with thousands of local units of government,
innumerable businesses, and far over a billion inhabitants. Governing such a giant
entity, while taking care of rampant corruption, public unrests, and fluctuations in the
global and local economies, is not an easy task. Yet, ‘fortunately’ for the Chinese
government, the last decade has brought about a huge shift in China’s infrastructure,
which has been transformed from a pre-digital ecosystem of cash payments and
messy real-world interactions towards an ecosystem of digital payments through
Baidu Pay, the online distribution of goods through Alibaba, and the sharing of
millions of messages and data files through WeChat. This infrastructure offers new
prospects for the Chinese government’s idea of the Social Credit System. It has
handed it effective tools to monitor its citizens’ behaviours, giving each citizen a
‘score’ based on behaviour and implementing a connected system of incentives.
Scoring Citizens
The Chinese Social Credit System gets easily likened to dystopian science
fiction scenarios in the West, which at least in part seems to be related to the
authoritarian character of the Chinese state. However, it seems wrong to assess
the system merely in relation to the potentially nefarious tendencies of Xi Jinping’s
administration, exemplified by rampant human right abuses, oppression of minorities,
and political persecutions. Notwithstanding these terrifying practices, we should
assess the Social Credit System in its own right, asking: is the implementation of
a Social Credit System leading to a dystopian political system? More specifically,
I will ask: is such a system more akin to a digital republic or a digital dictatorship?
The answer I will give here is that the ‘making’ of citizens implied in Social Credit
Systems both limits the political freedom of citizens to act virtuously and promotes
dictatorial rule.
In terms of the technical properties I define a Social Credit System as any system of
governance that uses surveillance capacities of the state and/or private entities to
trace behaviours of citizens, assigns scores to citizens, and incentivises behaviours
by means of awards or punishments based on the scores. I will depart from what I
believe is the crucial difference between such a system and other means for either
keeping public order or scoring individuals based on their behaviour. This crucial
difference lies in (1) tying the score based on multiple behaviours to who someone
is, as an entity that persists through time (i.e. to a person’s moral character), (2) as
a citizen, and not merely for instance as a taxi passenger (e.g. in getting an Uber
score) or a car driver (e.g. in getting traffic penalty points).
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With regard to the first issue, I would like to point at considerations for tying offences
such as major crimes to a person’s permanent criminal record and for excluding
minor offences from such a record. Tying offences to a permanent record entails
something about the person in question: they become part of someone’s history as
a good or bad citizen in the eyes of the public. A Social Credit System extends the
notion of a permanent record tied to a person to a great many kinds of everyday
behaviours. The second point can be illustrated by referring to the notion of civic
virtue invoked by the Chinese policy document on the Social Credit System, which
does not merely relate to being a good civil servant or being a good consumer, but
to being a good citizen. In other words, it is not just the score but also its integral
character (i.e. linking heterogeneous activities such as jaywalking to having access
to train tickets) that sets it apart from other scoring systems.
Promoting Civic Virtue?
Essentially, a Social Credit System aims to make good citizens, qua citizens, through
promoting certain civic virtues such as ‘trustworthiness’. This aim seems to resonate
with republican thought, which emphasises the vital importance of the cultivation
of civic virtue. However, I believe that the dispositions cultivated by a Social Credit
System cannot be rightfully designated as civic virtues, for two reasons: (1) because
a score constitutes an aim external to any ‘virtuous action’, and (2) because the
resulting activity tends to conformity rather than to distinction in the public sphere.
First, as Aristotle1) Aristotle (1999), Nicomachean Ethics, Irwin, T. (ed.). Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company. indicated, we can consider three ‘ultimate goods’
of action – pleasure, honour and eudaimonia. Pleasure and honour are not self-
contained, meaning that pleasure depends on some external stimulus (e.g.
consuming food) and honour on the external approval of others (e.g. having a certain
reputation in making a work of art). Only actions aimed at eudaimonia are self-
contained, meaning that their aim is achieved in acting (e.g. courage is attained in
acting courageously). Virtue, according to this reading, is the disposition that aims
at eudaimonia and does not entail aiming at anything external, such as money or
reputation. A Social Credit System seems to contradict this notion of virtue. On the
one hand, it promotes activities such as labouring for the community because it
offers a standard of reputation, which can be a source of honour – for instance, in
aiming at getting the highest credit score in the neighbourhood. On the other hand, it
promotes activities based on expected pleasure (e.g. receiving discounts on certain
consumption items) or pain (e.g. being put on a blacklist).
Second, as Hannah Arendt2) Arendt, H. (1958), The Human Condition. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. argues, virtuous action requires of a citizen to be
able to distinguish her/himself in the public sphere. Crucially, this means that the
outcomes of a citizen’s actions can always be unexpected because they constitute
what might be an exceptional, hence ‘excellent’ activity. In other words, acting
virtuously is not merely acting in an agreeable manner or following known social
conventions, but means standing out by distinguishing oneself. This notion of the
distinction entails that for virtuous actions there can be no fixed measurements
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or standards based on past, generic behaviours. A Social Credit System, again,
contradicts this notion of virtuous action. In order to score citizens, a certain list of
categories or a catalogue need to be established, based on observable, expected
behaviours that lead to either positive or negative evaluations. For instance, donating
money to charity is a measurable, observable type of behaviour that could be
positively evaluated. However, it in no way constitutes an activity by which a citizen
distinguishes herself in the public sphere. By subjecting ‘good’ and ‘bad’ actions to
upfront categorisations based on what can be expected and measured, a Social
Credit Systems promotes conformity and therefore demotes civic virtue.
Hence, it is highly questionable that a Social Credit System would lead to the
emergence of a ‘digital republic’, neither in China nor elsewhere. Would it contain a
tendency towards digital dictatorship? To answer this question, we would first need
to establish the meaning of dictatorial governance. This type of governance derives
from the master-slave relation of the ruler and the ruled, which is characterised
by the absence of political freedom. I argue that Social Credit Systems contain a
tendency towards dictatorial rule, which I will explicate according to (1) its output (i.e.
the resulting behaviour of the ruled) and (2) its input (i.e. the method of governance
applied by the ruling).
Virtuous Governance?
Firstly, I claim that the Social Credit System promotes ‘slavish’ behaviour. Being a
slave means essentially to be unfree, which can be explicated as (1) being subject
to necessity (i.e. having to ‘make a living’ through labour) and (2) being excluded
from the public realm, in which one can act and speak amongst other citizens. By
linking civic behaviour, such as having online discussions, with production and
consumption, such as having access to train tickets or cleaning the neighbourhood,
acting on the incentives mechanisms of a Social Credit System can become part
of life’s necessity. Certainly, many of the behaviours linked to the categories of
the Social Credit System remain in a certain sense voluntary (e.g. one can choose
to donate to a designated charity), but reckoning with the social credit score itself
becomes a necessity. In Arendt’s terms, civic behaviour in the public realm gets
progressively transformed into labour, the human activity aimed at continual
production and consumption, which is essentially an unfree activity. The more
people’s lives are dominated by a-political or anti-political concerns ‘in public’, such
as by labouring for the sake of the social credit score, the less they are free to
participate in political activities. Hence, the more citizens will have to reckon with the
effects of their everyday actions on their credit scores, the less they will be free to
engage in political action in the public sphere.
Secondly, I argue that the type of governance involved in a Social Credit System
promotes master-like rule. The prototype of such rule is the mastery of a craftsman
over his craft, because it implies full control over both means (e.g. materials,
instruments) and ends (e.g. function of a technical object). For this reason, Plato
likened his ideal statesman to a craftsman, who would use his social engineering
skills to control his populous. It is not hard to see how the Social Credit System
implies an effort of social engineering, but what sets it apart from other forms of
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social engineering is its instrumentalisation of the citizen. While the factory would
instrumentalise the worker, the worker would be free from its control outside of its
walls and outside of the bounds of the working day. Citizenship, however, permeates
public life, which led Aristotle to ask whether the good citizen is in any way different
from the good human being. The underlying notion of a Social Credit System is
therefore that the ruler, be it one man or a collective, instrumentalises his subjects,
and treats them as means towards a definite end – which in China’s case is social
order and the centralised power of the Communist Party.
Conclusion
To conclude, I argue that we ought to be suspicious of Social Credit Systems like
the one that is implemented in China, because of their tendency to demote civic
virtue and promote dictatorial rule. However, we need to make some reservations
concerning this conclusion. First, I argued from a perspective of Western political
philosophy that will likely be incompatible in certain respects with Chinese, notably
Confucian political philosophy. Second, it must seem obvious that matter of scale
and scope of any Social Credit System should not be neglected. Even though we
did not discuss those, it becomes immediately clear that a scoring system is less
problematic when applied to a limited set of activities (i.e. limited scale) or not to a
person qua citizen but only for instance qua responsible traffic participant (i.e. limited
scope).
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